Function mbedtls_pk_verify_ext

pub unsafe extern "C" fn mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(
    type_: mbedtls_pk_type_t,
    options: *const c_void,
    ctx: *mut mbedtls_pk_context,
    md_alg: mbedtls_md_type_t,
    hash: *const c_uchar,
    hash_len: usize,
    sig: *const c_uchar,
    sig_len: usize,
) -> c_int

\brief Verify signature, with options. (Includes verification of the padding depending on type.)

\param type Signature type (inc. possible padding type) to verify \param options Pointer to type-specific options, or NULL \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up. \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes) \param hash Hash of the message to sign \param hash_len Hash length or 0 (see notes) \param sig Signature to verify \param sig_len Signature length

\return 0 on success (signature is valid), #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH if the PK context can’t be used for this type of signatures, #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH if there is a valid signature in \p sig but its length is less than \p sig_len, or a specific error code.

\note If hash_len is 0, then the length associated with md_alg is used instead, or an error returned if it is invalid.

\note md_alg may be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, only if hash_len != 0

\note If type is MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS, then options must point to a mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options structure, otherwise it must be NULL. Note that if #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is defined, the salt length is not verified as PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT is used.